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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

In 1984, the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act greatly
simplified the approval process for generic drugs. It created the

†
JD, William Mitchell College of Law, May 2013. I wish to thank Frederik
Struve for his insightful comments on earlier drafts. Although I am an attorney
with the law firm of Merchant & Gould P.C., the views herein do not necessarily
represent those of the firm or the clients of the firm.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
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abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process, which allows a
generic drug to seek approval through establishing bioequivalence
to a previously approved pioneer drug. The generic drug was thus
able to avoid much of the time and expense associated with
conducting clinical trials to prove safety and efficacy. This
abbreviated approval process can lead to generic drugs entering
the market more quickly.
Although the ANDA process created by the Hatch-Waxman
Act is certainly not a benefit to manufacturers of pioneer drugs, the
Hatch-Waxman Act also included provisions that benefitted the
pioneer manufacturers. Generally, these benefits take the form of
extended patent rights.
2
Like drugs, class III medical devices are also subject to a timeconsuming and expensive approval process that attempts to ensure
the safety and efficacy of the device. But unlike drugs, an
abbreviated approval process is not generally available for medical
devices. This article will discuss the similarities between medical
devices and drugs, and argue that an abbreviated approval process
should be available for class III medical devices.
This article will first provide a brief overview of medical device
3
regulation and specifically the medical device approval process.
This article will also compare the approval processes for drugs and
4
medical devices. Next, this article will discuss the Hatch-Waxman
5
Act and its current application to medical devices. This article will
then analyze whether an abbreviated approval process for medical
6
devices would be beneficial. This article will also suggest a test for
7
determining when such an approval process would be appropriate.
Finally, this article will argue that the similarities between medical
2. Although the world of medical devices is quite expansive, this article will
focus on those class III medical devices that are subject to the premarket approval
process only. Class III medical devices are those devices “purported or represented
to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or that
“present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (2012). Additionally, class III medical devices require
the highest levels of controls to ensure safety and effectiveness. See id.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C)(i).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra Part VI.
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devices and drugs outweigh the differences and, accordingly, that
8
there should be an abbreviated review process for medical devices.
II. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION
Until 1976, medical devices were regulated by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) as drugs. Drugs are “articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and . . . articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function
9
of the body of man or other animals.” This definition is much
broader than the standard usage of the term drug. And, in fact, it
had been held to encompass items that are now thought of and
10
regulated as medical devices.
In 1976, a separate regulatory structure for medical devices was
11
added to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) with the
12
enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA).
Under the FDCA, a medical device is defined as “an instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro
reagent, or other similar or related article,” which is “intended for
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other
animals” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the
8. See infra Part VII.
9. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2012).
10. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that a laboratory
diagnostic—one that never touched nor was even in the same room as the
patient—was a drug and therefore was subject to the drug approval process.
See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 800 (1969).
11. Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331–397).
12. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). In addition to creating a
separate regulatory process for medical devices, the MDA also removed medical
devices from the reach of varied and potentially conflicting state regulatory
schemes. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (noting that
several states adopted approval processes in the seventies); see also id. at 342
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing “potentially conflicting state regulatory
regimes”). The MDA addressed this with a broad preemption clause that
eliminated most medical device regulatory requirements created by the states.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (stating that no state “may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement” that is
“different from, or in addition to, any requirement” of the MDA and “which
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 6

1410

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4

body of man or other animals” and, to exclude drugs and foods,
“does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical
action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is
not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
13
primary intended purposes.” This broad definition encompasses
14
15
everything from the ordinary to the extraordinary. However, this
article focuses on class III medical devices.
The medical device regulatory structure includes an approval
process for medical devices known as a premarket approval
16
(PMA). Similar to the new drug application (NDA) process that is
applicable to drugs, the PMA process is quite time consuming and
expensive, requiring, among other things, information on the
following: clinical investigations, principles of operation, and
17
manufacturing facilities and controls.
The PMA process, however, is not required for all medical
devices. Instead, medical devices are classified based on the level of
18
controls required to ensure safety and effectiveness. And only
those devices requiring the highest level of controls—class III
19
devices—are subject to the PMA process. Complex, implanted
20
medical devices, such as pacemakers, are typically among those
classified in class III and subject to the PMA process.
However, only those class III devices that were introduced after
21
the enactment of the MDA require PMA approval. By default,
22
devices introduced before the MDA do not require a PMA. The
FDA may, however, override this default by regulation and require

13. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
14. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 872.6855 (2013) (“Manual toothbrush”); id.
§ 872.6865 (“Powered toothbrush”); id. § 886.5850 (“Sunglasses”).
15. See, e.g., id. § 880.5740 (“Suction snakebite kit”).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 360e.
17. See id. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(C); see also infra Part III.
18. See id. § 360c(a)–(d).
19. Id. § 360e(a). In addition, class III devices are “purported or represented
to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or “presents a
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II).
20. 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610; see also, e.g., id. § 872.3630 (“Endosseous dental
implant abutment”); id. § 872.4760 (“Bone plate”).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f) (classifying devices introduced after enactment of
MDA as class III); id. § 360e(a)(2) (requiring PMA for devices that are class III
devices because of § 360c(f)).
22. See id. § 360e(a).
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23

a PMA for even a pre-1976 device. In addition, to prevent pre1976 devices from having a monopoly, a new device that is
substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device is also not subject to
24
the PMA process.
Those substantially equivalent devices are typically subject to
the less rigorous premarket notification process, which is also
25
known as the 510(k) process. Under the 510(k) process, a
manufacturer notifies the FDA that it intends to introduce a new
device, asserts that it is substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device,
26
and waits for an order from the FDA clearing the device.
Devices that enter the market through the 510(k) process
often do so by establishing a substantial equivalence chain. The
manufacturers of new devices assert substantial equivalence to a
recently introduced device, the manufacturers of which had
previously asserted substantial equivalence to a slightly older
device, and so on until the chain reaches a device introduced prior
to 1976. Each link in the chain can introduce incremental changes.
The devices at the opposite ends of the chains may not have much
27
in common at all. Nonetheless, much like the ANDA process
available for generic drugs, the 510(k) process provides many
benefits. For example, it fosters competition by allowing
competitors to enter the market more quickly. But the 510(k)
process is only available if the new device can be traced to a pre1976 device for which the FDA has not required a PMA.
In contrast, there are few shortcuts for competitors wishing to
28
enter the market for a class III device introduced after 1976.
Competitors typically may enter the market only after successfully
completing the rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive PMA
process. The PMA process often creates a barrier to entry that
allows the pioneer to reap monopoly profits, much like the holder
of a patent. Accordingly, competition may be stifled when it comes
23. See id. § 360e(b).
24. Id. § 360c(f).
25. Id. § 360(k). Section 360(k) corresponds to section 510(k) of the FDCA.
26. Id.; id. § 360(n).
27. This author has previously compared this to the children’s game of
telephone. See Brian P. Wallenfelt, Foreword: Is It Time for an Abbreviated Premarket
Approval for Medical Devices?, 39 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1026, 1028–29 (2013).
28. There actually are two potential shortcuts. First, a manufacturer may
petition the FDA to down-classify the device. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)–(3). Second, a
manufacturer may reference information (e.g., clinical trial data) in a PMA that
was approved more than six years earlier. Id. § 360j(h)(4).
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to devices subject to the PMA process—specifically, those class III
devices introduced after 1976.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, among other things, simplified the
approval process for generic drugs with the creation of the ANDA
29
process. However, because eight years earlier medical devices
were separated from the regulatory structure applicable to drugs,
that abbreviated approval process did not extend to medical
devices.
III. COMPARISON OF DRUG AND DEVICE APPROVAL PROCESSES
Both class III medical devices and new drugs require
regulatory approval prior to market introduction. A new drug may
30
not be introduced until an NDA for it has been approved.
Similarly, most class III medical devices may not be introduced
31
until an application for premarket approval has been approved.
In both cases, the regulatory processes require clinical trials, which
32
are expensive and time consuming. There are other similarities as
well. Both processes, at their core, aim to determine whether the
product is safe and effective.
A.

Similarities Between NDA and PMA Requirements

An NDA must include “full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use
33
and whether such drug is effective in use.” Similarly, a PMA must
include “full reports of all information, published or known to or
which should reasonably be known to the applicant, concerning
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such
34
device is safe and effective.” Typically, these investigations take the
form of clinical trials that are conducted to demonstrate that the
drug or device is safe and effective.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an
application . . . is effective with respect to such drug.”).
31. Id. § 360e(a) (“A class III device . . . is required to have . . . an approval
under this section of an application for premarket approval . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (discussing the
“rigorous” PMA process); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676
(1990) (discussing “costly and time-consuming studies” required in an NDA).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
34. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(A).
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Additionally, an NDA must include “a full list of the articles
35
used as components of such drug” and “a full statement of the
36
composition of such drug.” Similarly, a PMA must include “a full
statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and of
37
the principle or principles of operation, of such device.” These
requirements are very similar. The only difference is that the PMA
must include a full statement of the principle of operation of the
device. This reflects a difference in the nature of medical devices
and drugs. Medical devices are typically designed to use mechanical
or electrical components to perform a therapeutic function. This
design needs to be explained to understand and evaluate the
device. In any case, this information is quite similar and is used to
evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug or device.
An NDA must also include “a full description of the methods
used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture,
38
processing, and packing of such drug.” Similarly, a PMA also must
include “a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities
and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when
39
relevant, packing and installation of, such device.” Again, these
requirements are very similar. One difference is that the PMA
additionally requires information about installation of the device.
This refers to the procedure to implant or use the medical device.
This information is not necessary for a drug, because, typically, a
drug is not implanted.
Additionally, an NDA must include “such samples of such drug
and of the articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may
40
require.” Likewise, a PMA requires “such samples of such device
and of components thereof as the Secretary may reasonably
41
require,” but if submitting samples is “impracticable or unduly
burdensome, the requirement of this subparagraph may be met by
the submission of complete information concerning the location of
one or more such devices readily available for examination and
42
testing.” These requirements are also essentially the same. The

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. § 355(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 355(b)(1)(C).
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 355(b)(1)(D).
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(C).
Id. § 355(b)(1)(E).
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(E).
Id.
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differences here recognize that delivering a sample of a device may
be much more burdensome than delivering a sample of a drug.
Finally, an NDA must also include “specimens of the labeling
43
proposed to be used for such drug.” Similarly, the PMA also must
include “specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such
44
device.” Labeling is an expansive concept, which covers not only a
traditional label, but also much of the information distributed by a
45
manufacturer about an FDA regulated product. This requirement,
which is identical for an NDA and a PMA, gives the FDA the
opportunity to ensure the labeling is, among other things,
adequate and truthful.
B.

Differences Between NDA and PMA Requirements

Although there are many similarities between the NDA and
PMA processes, there are also some differences. An NDA requires
information that is not required in a PMA. Similarly, a PMA
requires information that is not required in an NDA. These
differences do not, however, impact the core of either the NDA or
PMA regulatory structures.
For example, an NDA must be accompanied by an assessment
of the safety and effectiveness of the drug for the claimed
46
indications in pediatric subpopulations. Similar information is not
required with a PMA. However, this requirement is not related to
the evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug. Instead,
47
this relatively recent requirement was added to spur research into
pediatric indications for new drugs. Thus, this requirement serves a
secondary goal and does not affect the overall approval scheme for
new drugs significantly. In fact, in some circumstances, this
requirement can even be deferred or waived by the Secretary of

43. Id. § 355(b)(1)(F).
44. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(F).
45. Id. § 321(m) (“The term ‘labeling’ means all labels and other written,
printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or
wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”). Further, the Supreme Court has
held that materials that are not on or in a drug package but are instead mailed
separately can still accompany the drug and be treated as labeling. See, e.g., Kordel
v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G); id. § 355c(a)(1)–(2).
47. See Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355c).
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48

Health and Human Services. For example, this requirement may
be waived when the drug “is not likely to be used in a substantial
49
number of pediatric patients.”
Additionally, an NDA must be submitted with a list of the
patent number and expiration date of any patent that claims the
50
drug or a method of using the drug. However, this provision is not
used by the FDA to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug.
51
Instead, it is published after the NDA is approved. The
information is then used in the generic drug approval process
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act. A PMA does not require similar
information because there is no generic medical device approval
process.
Similarly, a PMA requires elements that are not required in an
NDA. For example, a PMA must include references “to any
performance standard . . . which would be applicable to any aspect
52
of such device if it were a class II device.” Additionally, the PMA
must include information to show that the device complies with the
performance standard or information to justify a deviation from
53
the standard. A performance standard is specific to a type of class
II device and includes “provisions to provide reasonable assurance
54
of its safe and effective performance.”
For example, a
performance standard may include “provisions respecting the
construction, components, ingredients, and properties of the
55
56
device,” “provisions for the testing . . . of the device,” and
“provisions for the measurement of the performance characteristics
57
of the device.” An NDA is not required to submit similar
information, because there are no analogous concepts to classes
and performance standards for drugs.
As explained, there are many similarities between the
information required in a PMA and an NDA. Although there are
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355c(a)(3)–(4).
49. Id. § 355c(a)(4)(A)(iii)(II). This may be the case with a drug targeted to
a condition primarily associated with adulthood or aging (e.g., erectile dysfunction, Alzheimer’s disease, or osteoporosis).
50. Id. § 355(b).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(D).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 360d(a)(2)(A).
55. Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(i).
56. Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(ii).
57. Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(iii).
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also some differences, the differences are often unrelated to the
safety and efficacy determination that is central to both approval
processes. Based on the comparison between the drug and device
approval processes described above, the abbreviated approval
process of Hatch-Waxman could readily be extended to devices.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS APPLICATION
TO MEDICAL DEVICES
Three provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act are particularly
relevant to medical devices and will be discussed in greater detail
below. The first provision discussed is not applicable to medical
devices, while the other two are.
A.

Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and Paper New Drug
Application (Paper NDA)

The Hatch-Waxman Act created a bargain of sorts. It created
the ANDA process that focuses on similarity to an already approved
“pioneer” drug. It also created an exclusive period following the
approval of a new drug during which an ANDA cannot be
approved. This exclusive period serves to reward the manufacturer
for bearing the heavy burden of completing the new drug
regulatory process. But after that exclusive period expires,
competitors (i.e., generic drug manufacturers) may enter the
market through the ANDA process without going through the time
and expense of completing an NDA. This process aims to reward
innovation while also spurring competition.
Section 101 of the Hatch-Waxman Act created the ANDA
58
process and the paper NDA process. Both of these processes
create paths to approval of a drug that do not necessarily require
conducting clinical trials to establish safety and effectiveness, as
would be required for an NDA. These processes can allow a generic
59
drug manufacturer to avoid significant time and expense.
Instead of including “full reports of investigations which have
been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and

58. Hatch Waxman Act § 101, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (j).
59. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990)
(stating that ANDAs and Paper NDAs “permit an applicant seeking approval of a
generic drug to avoid the costly and time-consuming studies required for a
pioneer drug”).
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60

whether such drug is effective in use,” an ANDA must show that it
61
is bioequivalent to an already approved pioneer drug. The ANDA
must identify the pioneer drug, and the labeling for the generic
drug must not prescribe, recommend, or suggest conditions of use
62
that are not approved for the pioneer drug.
The pioneer’s efforts to develop and get the pioneer drug
approved are protected in two ways. First, the Hatch-Waxman Act
prohibits approving an ANDA until after a specific time period has
63
passed since the pioneer drug was approved. In this manner, the
pioneer drug receives a benefit for completing the NDA process.
The duration of the exclusivity period corresponds roughly to the
degree of novelty of the pioneer drug. For example, new uses of
known compounds receive a shorter exclusivity period than entirely
64
new compounds.
Second, an ANDA cannot be approved if doing so would
infringe the patent rights of the pioneer drug. The ANDA must
include “a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the
best of his knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the
[pioneer] drug . . . or which claims a use for such [pioneer] drug
for which the applicant is seeking approval” that addresses the
65
patent owner’s rights. This certification may address the patent
owner’s rights in multiple ways. For example, the generic drug may
certify that there are no patents that cover the pioneer drug, or
66
that all patents that cover the pioneer drug have expired.
Alternatively, the ANDA applicant may file the application but
choose to wait until the patents that cover the pioneer drug expire
67
to receive approval. Lastly, the ANDA applicant may assert that
the patents covering the pioneer drug are invalid or would not be
68
infringed. Filing this assertion is an act of infringement and
almost always leads to litigation.
69
The Hatch-Waxman Act also created a paper NDA process. It
provides many similar benefits to the ANDA process in that it can
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(F).
Compare id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii), with id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(II).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
Id. § 355(b)(2).
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be used to avoid conducting new clinical trials. However, unlike the
70
ANDA process, a paper NDA is not about proving bioequivalence.
Instead, in a paper NDA, the applicant still proves safety and
efficacy, but does so using studies and data that were gathered by
71
someone other than the applicant.
B.

Patent Term Extension

The Hatch-Waxman Act also amended the patent law to
extend a patent term due to delays in entering the market as a
72
result of the regulatory approval process. Typically, a patent
application claiming a drug will be filed well before the drug is
approved by the FDA. The patent term then lasts for twenty years
73
from the date the patent is filed. This means that a portion of the
74
patent term will pass before the product may be legally marketed.
Because the regulatory approval process often takes a long time,
the effect can be significant. The Hatch-Waxman Act attempted to
remedy this by providing a patent term extension to offset, at least
in part, the delays associated with seeking regulatory approval
75
under certain circumstances.

70. Compare id. § 355(b)(2), with id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
71. Id. § 355(b)(2).
72. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417, § 201, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–1603
(1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Although the term of a patent was calculated
differently at the time the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the effect was largely
the same. For patents filed prior to 1995, the patent term was measured from the
date of issuance and lasted for seventeen years. See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950,
66 Stat. 792, 804 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154). Section 154 was
amended to provide a twenty-year patent term from the original date of filing by
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 101, 108 Stat. 4809,
4815–16 (1994). In any case, the effect was the same, a portion of the exclusive
patent right often passed before the inventor was able to market and commercially
exploit the product.
74. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1990) (“When an
inventor makes a potentially useful discovery, he ordinarily protects it by applying
for a patent at once. Thus, if the discovery relates to a product that cannot be
marketed without substantial testing and regulatory approval, the ‘clock’ on his
patent term will be running even though he is not yet able to derive any profit
from the invention.”).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 156. There are some limits to the extension though. For
example, the term of only one patent may be extended due to the delay associated
with the regulatory approval of a single product. Id. § 156(c)(4).
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Unlike the provisions relating to ANDAs and paper NDAs, this
section of the Hatch-Waxman Act expressly references and applies
76
to medical devices.
C.

Uses Reasonably Related to Regulatory Submissions Are NonInfringing

Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Patent Act
to carve out a safe harbor from infringement for activities related to
77
regulatory submissions. As currently amended, this safe harbor
states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
78
products.
Although this section does not expressly state that it applies to
79
medical devices, the Supreme Court has held that it does. The
Court interpreted “submission of information under a Federal law
80
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” to apply to
81
the submission of information under any provision of the FDCA.
The Court additionally reasoned that this safe harbor from
infringement for activities related to regulatory submissions serves
to offset the patent term extension provided by section 156. If this
section did not apply to medical devices, a competitor would need
to wait for the patent term and its extension to expire before even
beginning to prepare a regulatory submission. This would create a
“de facto monopoly” that “would continue for an often substantial
period until regulatory approval was obtained” after the patent
82
expired.

76. Id. § 156(f)(1)(B) (“The term ‘product’ means . . . [a]ny medical
device . . . subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.”).
77. Hatch-Waxman Act § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
79. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 661.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
81. See e.g., Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666.
82. Id. at 670.
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V. THERE SHOULD BE AN ABBREVIATED APPROVAL PROCESS FOR
CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICES
As discussed above, the requirements of a PMA and an NDA
83
are quite similar. Additionally, the processes have the same goal:
to approve only those products that can establish safety and
effectiveness. Yet, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a shortcut for
drug approval but not device approval. The ANDA process serves as
a shortcut because it allows a new drug to receive regulatory
approval through a showing of bioequivalence to an already
approved drug. This section will explain why an abbreviated PMA
process would be equally beneficial for class III medical devices.
A.

Benefits Applicable to Generic Drugs Would Also Be Applicable to
Generic Class III Medical Devices

Many of the reasons that supported the creation of an
abbreviated approval process for drugs are equally applicable to
class III medical devices. For example, the ANDA process was
created to spur the growth of the generic drug market in the
United States and, in turn, create a more competitive market with
84
lower prices for unpatented drugs. An abbreviated approval
process would serve the same goals in the market for unpatented
medical devices.
An additional benefit of the abbreviated approval process is
that it provides for better allocation of societal resources both by
applicants and by the FDA. In general, the resources (money, time,
intelligence, etc.) devoted to conducting clinical trials and
reviewing results of those clinical trials are not productively
deployed when the product in the trial has previously been
evaluated. The purpose of a clinical trial is to generate new
information (e.g., whether a drug or device is safe and effective).
Because a clinical trial conducted on a generic equivalent to an
already approved product would be expected to generate the same
results as the trial conducted on the pioneer product, the trial will
83. See supra Part III.A.
84. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A central purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is ‘to enable
competitors to bring cheaper, generic . . . drugs to market as quickly as possible.’”)
(citing 149 Cong. Rec. S15,885 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)); In re Barr Labs., 930
F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Congress sought to get generic drugs into the hands
of patients at reasonable prices—fast.”).
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not generate new information. Accordingly, the trial will not
produce any benefit even though conducting and reviewing it will
consume significant resources. This reasoning is equally applicable
to drugs and medical devices. Assuming equivalency is proven,
there is no reason to expect that a clinical trial of a generic medical
device would produce new information about the medical device.
Accordingly, an abbreviated PMA process would lead to better
allocation of resources than would occur if clinical trials were
repeated on an equivalent but new medical device.
Although it is always possible that more testing could identify a
rare side effect or new issues relating to the safety and efficacy of a
device, it is not likely. The clinical trials that are used to approve
devices are designed to establish safety and efficacy to a high
degree of statistical certainty. More testing is unlikely to alter the
conclusions of these tests. And the costs of conducting these tests
likely outweigh the possible benefits. In fact, if the opposite were
true—that the expected benefits of more testing outweigh the
costs—the pioneer should not have been approved in the first
place.
Additionally, there are also ethical benefits to an abbreviated
approval process for both drugs and devices. Clinical trials
generally include a study group and a control group of subjects
who are in need of the therapy provided by the drug or the device.
The study group receives the therapy (e.g., drug, device, etc.) being
evaluated. The control group does not. Often, the control group
receives no treatment whatsoever. If a drug or device exists and has
been proven to be effective in treating a particular condition, it
may be unethical to withhold that treatment from subjects in the
control group simply to study an equivalent product. This
reasoning is equally applicable to both drugs and devices.
B.

Abbreviated Approval Is Even More Appropriate for Medical Devices
Than It Is for Drugs

Although there are many similarities between devices and
drugs, there are also significant differences. These differences,
however, do not support imposing a more robust regulatory
process for generic medical devices than exists for generic drugs. If
anything, the differences suggest that an abbreviated review process
makes more sense for devices than it does for drugs.
For both devices and drugs, an abbreviated approval process is
harmful to the pioneer manufacturer. The abbreviated approval
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process lowers the cost and time required to for a competitor to
enter the market. This of course cuts into the pioneer’s sales.
However, the typical cost structures for medical devices and drugs
suggest that the abbreviated process would be less harmful to
medical device pioneers than it is to drug pioneers.
For example, a generic producer will likely be able to avoid
more of the costs associated with providing a drug than a medical
device. This is because manufacturing costs are likely to represent a
larger portion of the costs associated with a medical device than
with a drug. Medical devices are usually assembled from multiple
physical components, at least some of which may be custom
manufactured for a particular device. These components and the
skilled labor required for their assembly may be expensive. Drugs,
on the other hand, are less likely to have these expenses.
Instead, the costs of drugs are often attributed to the research
and development costs associated with discovering and investi85
gating pharmaceutical compounds. Of course, medical devices
also often have significant research and development costs. And in
both cases, the generic producer can avoid these expenses by
copying the pioneer.
However, the generic producer cannot avoid the manufacturing costs. And since these may be more significant in devices,
the generic manufacturer is comparatively less advantaged with
medical devices than with drugs. This difference, if anything,
suggests that the manufacturer of a pioneer medical device needs
less protection than the manufacturer of a pioneer drug.
Accordingly, the process for market entry by a generic medical
device manufacturer should not be any more robust than the
process for entry by a generic drug manufacturer.
C.

Fairness to the Pioneer

A potential argument against an abbreviated approval process
is that it would be unfair to the pioneer to allow a competitor to
enter the market without undertaking the same regulatory
expenses as the pioneer. Although a pioneer device manufacturer
is treated differently than a generic one under an abbreviated
85. See, e.g., Mathew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion,
Pushing Big Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new
-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/.
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approval process, this is not necessarily unfair when the full context
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, including its benefits, are considered.
Additionally, creating an abbreviated approval process for medical
devices would create fairness across industries in that drug and
device manufacturers would be treated equally.
The Hatch-Waxman Act created benefits to pioneer drug
manufacturers to offset, at least in part, the potential unfairness of
competitors having an easier path to market entry. If anything, the
Hatch-Waxman Act currently unfairly benefits pioneer medical
device manufacturers because it provides many of the benefits to
medical devices without imposing the corresponding detriments.
Most significantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for patent term
86
extension due to regulatory approval delays. As noted previously,
this benefit is already available to pioneer medical devices, even
though the pioneer medical device manufacturer is not subject to
the detriment of competitors having access to an abbreviated
approval process.
Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides other protections for pioneer drug manufacturers that could be extended to
medical device manufacturers as well. Under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, an ANDA may not be approved until a sufficient period of time
87
has passed since the referenced pioneer drug was approved. In
essence, the pioneer drug receives a period of market exclusivity in
88
exchange for bearing the regulatory approval of the NDA process.
A similar delay before an abbreviated application could be
approved would be appropriate for medical devices as well.
VI. EQUIVALENCY IN CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICES
An abbreviated approval process for class III medical devices
would need to define the criteria for when a generic medical device
is equivalent to a pioneer device and thus eligible to take advantage
of the abbreviated process. This section discusses equivalency in the
ANDA process for drugs and the 510(K) process for medical

86. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 63–64 and accompanying text.
88. This market exclusivity is not guaranteed. A competitor is always free to
seek approval through the normal NDA process. In that case, however, the
competitor is likely to incur similar regulatory costs as the pioneer did.
Accordingly, this is not unfair to the pioneer.
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devices and suggests relevant criteria for determining equivalency
in an abbreviated approval process for class III medical devices.
The process for determining equivalence for a class III medical
device would have to be different from the process of determining
equivalence for a drug. An ANDA must include information to
89
establish bioequivalence. Generally, a drug is bioequivalent if “the
rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant
difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the” pioneer
90
drug when administered similarly. This standard would not be
applicable to medical devices because medical devices do not
typically operate through absorption. However, “[f]or a drug that is
not intended to be absorbed into the bloodstream, the Secretary
may establish alternative, scientifically valid methods to show
bioequivalence if the alternative methods are expected to detect a
significant difference between the drug and the listed drug in safety
91
and therapeutic effect.” Conceptually, this standard is as
applicable to medical devices as drugs and could be the starting
point of an equivalence standard for medical devices.
A relevant standard is already applied to medical devices in the
510(k) process. In the 510(k) process, a device may be approved if
92
it is substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device. There are two
tests for determining substantial equivalence. First, a device is
substantially equivalent if it “has the same technological
93
characteristics as the predicate device.” Additionally, a device is
substantially equivalent even if it “has different technological
characteristics” if information is submitted “that demonstrates that
the device is as safe and effective as a legally marketed device” and
the device “does not raise different questions of safety and
94
effectiveness than the predicate device.”
The first branch of the substantial equivalence standard would
be equally effective as an equivalence standard under an
abbreviated PMA process. This standard would not allow for the
89. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
90. Id. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). In some circumstances, a generic drug can be
considered bioequivalent even though the rate of absorption is different, so long
as the difference is “intentional, is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not
essential to the attainment of effective body drug concentrations on chronic use,
and is considered medically insignificant for the drug.” Id. § 355(j)(8)(B)(ii).
91. Id. § 355(j)(8)(C).
92. Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(ii).
93. Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i).
94. Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(II).
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long equivalence chains that are common in 510(k) applications.
Instead, it would require a stricter degree of equivalence.
Additionally, an abbreviated PMA could require that
equivalence be established to PMA-approved devices only and not
to other devices that were instead approved through the
abbreviated process. This too would eliminate equivalence chains
by requiring that the equivalence comparison be made to the
device that did in fact undergo extensive clinical trials and scrutiny.
In light of the higher risk profile of class III devices, this degree of
strictness may be warranted. While stricter than the 510(k) process,
this standard would still encourage a robust generic device market
for PMA-approved class III medical devices.
In some cases, establishing this degree of equivalence may
involve testing, including clinical trials. However, the purpose of
the testing and trials would be quite different than the clinical trials
conducted for a PMA. These tests would be focused on establishing
equivalency—not on establishing safety and efficacy. Additionally,
this testing may be necessary to establish that the manufacturing
processes used by the generic manufacturer are sufficient. Again
though, proving this is far different than proving that the device
itself is safe and effective.
VII. CONCLUSION
The innovations of the Hatch-Waxman Act should be fully
extended to medical devices by creating an abbreviated approval
process for class III medical devices that mirrors the ANDA process
for drugs. As it currently stands, the regulatory approval process for
new class III devices stands as a roadblock to market competition,
creating a potential monopoly for pioneer medical device
manufacturers that can extend beyond the duration of patents that
cover the device. But the costs of regulatory approval processes are
not the right tools for creating monopoly rights because the costs
incurred to undertake repeated regulatory submissions on identical
products are wasted. Instead, the medical device regulatory system
should aim to facilitate market entry by competitors when the
patent on a medical device expires. This is just what an abbreviated
approval process would do.
Drugs have an abbreviated approval process, while class III
medical devices do not. There is no reason that these two industries
95.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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that are so important to health care should be regulated so
differently. The differences between medical devices and
pharmaceuticals do not justify this disparate treatment.
The addition of an abbreviated review process for class III
medical devices would also remedy an imbalance in the way the
Hatch-Waxman Act is applied to medical devices. Many of the
benefits of the Hatch-Waxman Act are currently extended to
pioneer medical device manufacturers but the detriments are not.
This creates a playing field that may be unfairly slanted in favor of
the pioneer medical device manufacturer.
Additionally, extending the Hatch-Waxman Act to class III
devices would potentially create a more robust generic market for
medical devices. Further, it is unlikely that the abbreviated review
process would stifle innovation in the medical device marketplace.
It certainly has not done so for drugs.
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